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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
MAURIA T. TANNER (SWENSEN), ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR., ] 
Defendant and Appellee. 
I REPLY TO APPELLEE'S RESPONSE 
Civil Case No. 924901803DA 
I Appellate Case No. 940079-CA 
RULE 9 (C)(2)A; JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
This appeal is authorized under Utah Code Annotated, sec. 78-
2-2 (3)(j), and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 which indicates 
a procedure for taking appeals from judgments and order of trial 
courts. This brief follows the structural requirements outlined in 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. This is an appeal 
by Mauria T. Tanner (Swensen), Plaintiff, from a judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. 
RULE 9(C)(3): NATURE OF PRECEDENCE 
This appeal is from a trial of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable Dennis Frederick, without a jury. The final orders were 
Amended Decree Of Divorce and Amended Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions of Law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the division of the marital property was 
equitable. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
alimony of $700 per month for a two-year period. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imputing 
income from Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art 
classes in the past during the summer, for purposes of child 
support and alimony. 
4. Whether the trial court abused it's discretion in using 
Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc., in figuring child support 
and/or alimony. 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding 
that Ms. Tanner has the future capacity to earn $20,000 a year in 
approximately two years. 
6. Whether the court abused its discretion in not awarding 
attorney's fees. 
7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not 
allowing Plaintiff's counsel to present a closing argument. 
RULE 9(C)4: STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts which are material to the questions presented on 
this appeal are as follows: 
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1. The parties had a long-term marriage, approximately 19 
years. They were married on the 22nd day of November, 1974, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (Record at 23, line 15) 
2. The parties have four children. (Record at 21, line 13) 
3. Mauria Tanner worked to help James Swensen, Jr. obtain 
two separate graduate degrees. (Record at 23, lines 18-25, Record 
at 24, line 1-6) 
4. James Swensen, Jr., is currently a tax attorney as well 
as a Certified Public Accountant with a Masters Degree in 
Accountancy. (Record at 23 & 24) 
5. Ms. Tanner has recently begun a graduate program which 
should be completed within two years with a Masters Degree in 
Expressive Therapy from the University of Utah. (Record 23, lines 
1-10) 
6. Ms. Tanner testified that in two years, she is hopeful 
that she might earn up to $20,000 a year. (Record at 94, lines 2-4) 
7. Mr. Swensen's projected annual income for the year of 
1993 was $67,500 (Defendant's Exhibit 2, page 0000043) 
8. Ms. Tanner has, in the past, earned approximately $1,500 
a year for teaching Art in the summer time; however, she is not 
planning to continue this seasonal job as a result of her year-
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round school obligation. (Transcript of Judge's Ruling, page 3, 
line 19) 
9. Ms. Tanner owes her Father $3,000, of which $2,000 went 
to Attorney's fees. (Record 35, lines 13-18) 
10. Ms. Tanner paid just under $5,000 for Attorney's fees 
just prior to the loan from her Father. (Record at 35, lines 16-18) 
11. Ms. Tanner owed approximately $12,000 to law offices of 
present counsel. (Record 36, lines 17-20) 
12. Ms. Tanner's lifestyle significantly altered since the 
separation. (Record at 39, lines 5-20) 
13. The Tanner Corporation made disbursements for the purpose 
of paying the personal taxes of the parties. (Record at 48, lines 
3-3) 
14. Ms. Tanner had no control over any of the IRA's , 
retirement accounts, savings accounts, or other significant marital 
assets during separation - making no withdrawals from any of these 
accounts. (Record at 51, lines 23-25, Record at 52, lines 5-6) 
15. Ms. Tanner never gave her permission to use or withdraw 
marital funds. (Record at 55, lines 1-2) 
16. Mr. Swensen withdrew significant amounts from the marital 
IRA accounts during the separation. (Record at 53, lines 14-19) 
17. Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen gave himself zero value 
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for furniture, he has in his possession, although he admits taking 
marital property. (Record at 152, lines 1-25, record at 153, lines 
1-4, record 155, lines 1-25, and record at 156, lines 1-25) 
18. Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen paid his personal legal 
fees from marital funds during the separation. (Record at 164, 
lines 11-15) 
19. Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen used marital funds to 
pay off his student loans in the approximate amount of $10,996. 
(Record at 168, lines 2-25) 
20. Plaintiff's expert witness, a CPA, never received 
requested materials and relied upon Swensen's figure for 
values regarding Defendant's business. (Record at 7, lines 7-20, 
record at 16, lines 10-18, and record at 19, lines 20-25) 
21. Ms. Tanner has received some monies on a periodic basis 
from Tanner, Inc., a family corporation. These disbursements have 
occurred approximately five times in 19 years. The amounts have 
varied. Ms. Tanner has generally received approximately $2,000 in 
one year until several years ago when she received $8,000 two 
years in succession. (Record at 50, lines 24-25, record at 51) 
22. Ms. Tanner received these two $8,000 amounts as a result 
of the sale of a trading post business. (Record at 48, lines 18-23, 
record at 50, lines 12-23) 
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23. The two previous disbursements from Tanner Inc. were 
$2,000 and $4,000 respectively. (Record at 49, lines 1-5) 
24. These disbursements were generally intended to cover Ms. 
Tanner's allotted portion of the taxes for the family business. 
(Record at 50) 
25. Ms. Tanner has been advised that she will not be 
receiving any more lump sum payments as large as the amount of 
$8,000 in the future by her father, Mr. Maurice Tanner, the 
President of Tanner, Inc. Those larger $8,000 amounts accrued 
solely as a result of the sale of the trading post business. 
(Record at 50, lines 12-33) 
26. At trial, Plaintiff's counsel was not given the 
opportunity to present a closing argument to make the court aware 
of case law which pertained to the issues of fact and law before 
the court, (Record at 192, lines 20-24) 
27. The trial court imputed income from sources no longer 
available to Ms. Tanner.(Record at 50, lines 12-33) 
28. Ms. Tanner is planning to pursue a Ph.D. degree if 
possible. Such training will require approximately 7 years (2 years 
for the Masters' degree and an additional 5 years for the Ph.D.) 
(Record at 99, lines 20-25, record at 100, line 1) 
29. Ms. Tanner was awarded alimony for 2 years (Transcript of 
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Judge's Ruling, pages 1 & 2) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate Court 
must reverse if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of 
the law, if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings 
or conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must be 
rectified as set forth in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977) . 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. The division of the marital property was not equitable. 
Newmever v, Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987), stated that 
"in determining whether a certain division of property is equitable 
. . . the relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves 
after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable...division of the 
fixed assets of the marriage". 
Ms. Tanner contends that in the division of the property, the 
trial court did not take into consideration her special 
circumstances, i.e., her relative lack of work experience, and her 
full-time student status. 
2. The court accepted values of property not consistent with 
the worth of the property if sold, causing an inequitable division 
of property. 
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3. The court's award of $700 per month alimony for a two-
year period is an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 
250, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1994). 
4. The court abused its discretion in imputing income from 
Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art classes in the 
summer as Ms. Tanner can no longer participate in that activity 
because of her participation in year-round schooling. Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, (S. Ct. 1983). Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 
408, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 78. Ms. Tanner provided an accurate figure 
regarding income for the purposes of child support. 
5. Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc. qualifies as a pre-
inheritance gift and the court abused it's discretion in utilizing 
the family corporation in figuring child support and/or alimony, 
as it was not income but a property interest. 
A. Ms. Tanner testified at trial that her brothers and 
sisters also received similar disbursements to hers. 
B. That the Tanner family corporation has been in place for 
approximately 35 years and it was in the form of pre-
inheritance. (Record at 46, lines 16-21, record at 47, 
line 11, and record at 47, lines 24-25). Typically, 
inherited property will be awarded to the person who 
inherited it, even when the property was inherited years 
before the divorce. 
C. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Ut. 1987). If the 
court should determine that Tanner, Inc., was not pre-
inheritance, it would be forced to admit that the 
Plaintiff's/Appellant's interest in the family 
corporation property was premarital property, at the very 
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least, an interest which had not been commingled into the 
marital estate, and one that was not augmented and/or 
maintained by the other spouse in any capacity. A court 
must find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding 
the general rule that premarital property is separate 
property. Waiters v. Waiters, 812 P.2d 64 (Ut. App. 
1989). 
6. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Ms. 
Tanner could earn $20,000 a year in two years, after she completed 
her schooling. It presumed that she will indeed complete the 
schooling, secure employment and earn that amount. Wiley v« Wiley, 
227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39 (1993), found such a finding improper. 
7. The court abused its discretion in not awarding 
attorney's fees. Utah law provides that the award be based upon the 
need of the party seeking the award, and reasonableness of the fee 
sought. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Ut. 1986). Sinclair v. 
Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Ut. 1986). Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117 
(Ut. 1986). Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Ut. App. 
1988) . 
8. The court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Plaintiff's counsel to present argument and cases relevant to the 
matter at bar in closing argument. Bunnell v. The Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331, 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1987). 
ARGUMENT 
Appellee relies upon Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 
Reply to Appellee Response 
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA 
Page 9 
(Utah App 1992) , as authority in claiming that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital property. 
In Roberts. as in the matter at hand, the property 
distribution is an issue. The court clearly states that property 
distribution must be based on adequate findings. The Court defined 
"adequate findings " in that opinion in its review of the custody 
issue. In cases tried by the bench, the court is required to find 
the fact specifically and ground its decision on findings of fact 
which resolve the material factual uncertainties and those findings 
should be expressed in enough detail to enable a reviewing court 
to determine whether they are Utah R. Civ P. 52 (a) - "To ensure the 
court acted within its broad discretion, the facts & reasons for 
the courts decision must be set forth fully in appropriate Findings 
and Conclusions." These findings must be adequate to ensure on 
appeal that the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based. (Painter v. Painter 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Ut App 
1988.) 
Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P. 2d 78, 83, describes the legal 
standards applied by the appellate courts which are based on Utah 
Code Ann Sec. 30-3-10(1) (1989) which requires the trial court to 
be a guide in assessing correctness, not merely proceeding 
conclusions of law. The Findings should divine how the court 
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reached it's final legal conclusion. 
In Roberts, as here, the wife also contested the nominal 
alimony award. As in Roberts, no where, in the findings did the 
court make a specific analysis of the parties circumstances in 
light of the Jones analysis, 
[1] needs of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income; 
and 
[2] ability of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income; 
and 
[3] ability of supporting spouse to provide support. 
As in Roberts, this court did not make specific or adequate 
findings on the parties relative needs, or make a comparison of 
their relative abilities to provide support. 
The Findings are clearly insufficient to give weight to the 
court's judgement regarding property division and alimony. 
In addition, the Appellee contends that this court must 
examine the entire distribution of property and not reverse on any 
isolated item of property. Naranyo 751 P. 2d At 1148. The 
Appellant agrees and encourages the court to review the broad sweep 
of property division, attorney's fees, child support and alimony to 
determine if the court has not shown prejudice against Appellant. 
A clarification of the facts specified by Appellee might be 
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helpful in regards to the ruling of division of marital property in 
this case, such as the fact that contrary to the Response brief, 
Ms. Tanner's expert testified that he did have personal experience 
in valuing a law firm (R-8-11) , not that he was inexperienced. 
Mr. Swenson argues that in Finlayson v. Finlavson, 874 P.2d 
843, 849 (Utah App 1994), there was dispute "regarding whether the 
loan from husband's mother was actually an enforceable debt or 
gift. The court, however, clearly gives its basis of division in 
that a trial abuses its discretion when it unilaterally allows one 
party, the husband in this case, to use a large share of the liquid 
assets to discharge debt. The court, here as well as in Finlavson, 
should have equitably distributed the liquid assets. 
Appellee argues that the financial declarations should not be 
a basis for making a final award. The financial declarations were 
part of the record, the parties also testified regarding the 
figures therein contained. Certainly, they should be utilized in 
a determination. 
Appellee misstates when he alleges the marital home was 
appraised by Ms. Tanner's own appraiser. Indeed, the appraiser was 
suggested by Mr Swenson. 
Mr. Swenson includes the amount in Tanner Inc. in his 
discussion of Ms. Tanner's large award. Tanner Inc. was clearly 
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pre-marital property and any review of those assets in relation to 
the marital estate is clearly improper. Appellee improperly 
characterizes Ms, Tanner's disposable income. This 
mischaracterization is evidenced again as Ms. Tanner received 
monies from her family in her purchase of a computer and testified 
she borrowed money from her father In enroll .nil pay for self-
esteem training. She did not pay for those things herself, as 
evidenced by the record. 
The court abused its discretion in imputing income. i ontrary 
to the characterization of the facts in Appellees Brief: 
[1] Ms. Tanner testified she would be receiving no further 
large distributions from Tanner Inc. Certainly none that would 
come close to the $8,000 figure. In fact, she clearly stated that 
the large amount was a one time occurrence because of the sale of 
a family owned Trading Post Business. 
[2] In addition, because of her schooling, Ms. Tanner 
testified she had not been teaching summer art classes nor did she 
intend to continue to do so because her schooling went all year 
round. 
[3] Ms. Tanner turther testified that any stipends she may 
have received were not continuing. 
Ms. Tanner also testified she expects to earn $20,000 if, in 
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fact, she completes her graduate program but she has not made 
inquiries to determine whether that expectation is valid. 
CONCLUSION 
The Findings at trial in the instant case exemplify a pattern 
abuse of discretion and prejudice against the Plaintiff in almost 
every instance. 
The parties have had a long-term marriage. The Appellee is a 
professional tax attorney and C.P.A.; the Appellant, primarily a 
mother with little work experience, who presently is a full-time 
graduate student. The court heard evidence that the Appellant had 
not really worked since she put the Appellee through law school, 
(almost 2 0 years ago) and yet the court ordered term alimony for 
only two years. 
In terms of the child support award, the court imputed the 
Appellant income from summer art classes she testified she could no 
longer participate in as well as from periodic pre-inheritance sums 
of money, which Appellant testified she would not have any 
significant access to in the future. 
The court did not take into consideration the differences in 
ability to produce income while making a division of the marital 
assets. 
Although, Ms. Tanner was not earning any income, the court 
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awarded no attorney's fees and made a Finding that the Appellant 
had not testified as to need which, in fact, was not consistent 
with the record. Appellant's counsel also testified as to 
reasonableness. 
The Trial court refused to listen to closing argument and 
directly articulated that the
 COurt was not interested in 
Appellant's rights. 
Dated this 11th day of January, 1995. 
RespectfulIv submitted, 
Nebeker, McConkie & Wright 
//l^^UZcJZ 
Katnleen McConkie, Esq. 
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